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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l e e , ] 
v s . ] 
JASON WOODS AND 
CHARLES DION, ; 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t s 
I Case No: 960269-CA 
I P r i o r i t y : (2 ) 
) all parties listed on cover 
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal in a criminal proceedings from a 
Judgment and Order denying the Motion to Suppress entered by 
the Sixth District Court in and for Sevier County, State of 
Utah. Permission to appeal from the interlocutory order was 
granted by this Court pursuant to Rule of 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. There are no related or prior 
appeals. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW THE STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY AND CITATIONS 
1. SHOULD LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS BE REQUIRED UNDER 
THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION TO HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
PRIOR TO STOPPING A VEHICLE? 
Standard of review: In Ornelas v. United States, 96 C.D.O.S 
3744, No. 95-5257 (U.S. Supreme Court May 28, 1996)the Court held 
that questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make 
a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo. In considering a 
motion to suppress, the Court reviews a trial court's underlying 
factual findings under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. 
Smith, 781 P.2d at 881; However, the Court reviews the trial 
court's ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual 
findings under a "correctness" standard. State v. Steward, 806 
P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991; State v. Lope, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to 
Suppress, see page 20 of the Record. The Decision on the Motion 
to Suppress is set forth on page 70 of the record and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the 
record. 
2. SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE FOUND THAT THE 
UNIQUE INVESTIGATORY TECHNIQUE OF STOPPING A VEHICLE BEFORE 
DEVELOPING PROBABLE CAUSE OF A DRIVING PATTERN IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DEVELOPED TO STOP THE OUT-OF-STATE 
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VEHICLE TO INVESTIGATE FOR POSSIBLE DRUG VIOLATIONS? 
Standard of review: In Ornelas v. United States, 96 C.D.O.S 
3744, No. 95-5257 (U.S. Supreme Court May 28, 1996)the Court held 
that questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make 
a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo. In considering a 
motion to suppress, the Court reviews a trial court's underlying 
factual findings under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. 
Smith, 781 P.2d at 881/ However, the Court reviews the trial 
court's ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual 
findings under a "correctness" standard. State v. Steward, 806 
P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991; State v. Lope, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to 
Suppress, see page 20 of the Record. The Decision on the Motion 
to Suppress is set forth on page 70 of the record and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the 
record. 
3. SHOULD THE LOWER COURT HAVE APPLIED "COMMUNITY 
CARETAKER" LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO RANDOM STOPS MADE TO CHECK 
POSSIBLE TIRED DRIVERS? 
Standard of review: In considering a motion to suppress, the 
Court reviews a trial court's underlying factual findings under a 
"clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 881; 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 974. However, we review the trial court's 
ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual findings 
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under a "correctness" standard. State v. Steward, 806 P. 2d 213, 
215 (Utah App. 1991; State v. Lope, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 
1992). In Ornelas v. United States, 96 C.D.O.S 3744, No. 95-5257 
(U.S. Supreme Court May 28, 1996)the Court held that questions of 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless 
search should be reviewed de novo. 
Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to 
Suppress, see page 20 of the Record. The Decision on the Motion 
to Suppress is set forth on page 70 of the record and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the 
record. 
4. WERE THE DEFENDANTS UNLAWFULLY DETAINED AFTER THE DEPUTY 
HANDED BACK THE DRIVERS LICENSE AND THEN ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN 
CONSENT TO SEARCH? 
Standard of review: In considering a motion to suppress, the 
Court reviews a trial court's underlying factual findings under a 
"clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 881; 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 974. However, we review the trial court's 
ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual findings 
under a "correctness" standard. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 
215 (Utah App. 1991/ State v. Lope, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 
1992). In Ornelas v. United States, 96 C.D.O.S 3744, No. 95-5257 
(U.S. Supreme Court May 28, 1996)the Court held that questions of 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless 
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search should be reviewed de novo. 
Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to 
Suppress, see page 20 of the Record. The Decision on the Motion 
to Suppress is set forth on page 70 of the record and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the 
record. 
5. DID THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEPUTY WAS NOT 
IN A POSITION TO DETECT THE ODOR OF MARIJUANA AND THE 
OBJECTIVE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT THE DEPUTIES SUBJECTIVE 
ALLEGATION? 
Standard of review: The Court reviews the trial court's 
ultimate legal conclusions flowing from these factual findings 
under a "correctness" standard. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 
215 (Utah App. 1991; State v. Lope, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 
1992). In Ornelas v. United States, 96 C.D.O.S 3744, No. 95-5257 
(U.S. Supreme Court May 28, 1996)the Court held that questions of 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless 
search should be reviewed de novo. 
Citation to Record: The Appellant's filed a Motion to 
Suppress, see page 20 of the Record. The Decision on the Motion 
to Suppress is set forth on page 70 of the record and the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the 
record. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes -
Provisions - Traffic-control devices. 
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for 
traffic the following provisions apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely 
within a single lane and may not be moved from the lane until the 
operator has determined the movement can be made safely. 
(2) On a roadway divided into three lanes... (n/a) 
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing 
specified traffic to use a designated lane or designating those 
lanes to be used by traffic moving in a particular direction 
regardless of the center of the roadway. Operators of vehicles 
shall obey the directions of these devices. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 51; C. 1943, 57-7-128; L. 1949, 
ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 18; 1978, ch. 33, § 14; 1987, 
ch. 138, § 60. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 17-22-2. Sheriff - General duties. 
(1) The sheriff shall: 
(a) preserve the peace; 
(b) make all lawful arrests; 
(c) attend in person or by Deputy the Supreme Court and the Court 
of Appeals when required or when the court is held within his 
county, all courts of record, and court commissioner and referee 
sessions held within his county, obey their lawful orders and 
directions, and comply with the court security rule, Rule 3-414, 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration; 
(d) attend county justice courts if the judge finds that the 
matter before the court requires the sheriff's attendance for 
security, transportation, and escort of jail prisoners in his 
custody, or for the custody of jurors; 
(e) command the aid of as many inhabitants of his county as he 
considers necessary in the execution of these duties; 
(f) take charge of and keep the county jail and the jail 
prisoners; 
(g) receive and safely keep all persons committed to his custody, 
file and preserve the commitments of those persons, and record 
the name, age, place of birth, and description of each person 
committed; 
(h) release on the record all attachments of real property when 
the attachment he receives has been released or discharged; 
(I) endorse on all process and notices the year, month, day, 
6 
hour, and minute of reception, and, upon payment of fees, issue a 
certificate to the person delivering process or notice showing 
the names of the parties, title of paper, and the time of 
receipt; 
(j) serve all process and notices as prescribed by law; 
(k) if he makes service of process or notice, certify on the 
process or notices the manner, time, and place of service, or, if 
he fails to make service, certify the reason upon the process or 
notice, and return them without delay; 
(1) extinguish fires occurring in the undergrowth, trees, or 
wooded areas on the public land within his county; 
(m) perform as required by any contracts between the county and 
private contractors for management, maintenance, operation, and 
construction of county jails entered into under the authority of 
Section 17-5-274; and 
(n) perform any other duties that are required by law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal prosecution based upon a felony 
information charging each Defendant with one count of Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, more than one hundred pounds of 
marijuana, a Felony Second Degree Felony in the Sixth District 
Court in and for Sevier County, State of Utah. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant's filed a Motion to Suppress (page 20 of the 
Record) after the information was bound over for trial. Prior to 
trial, an evidentiary hearing was held on January 9, 1996 (a 
transcript of the hearing is set forth at page 162 of the record) 
The Trial Court issued a Decision denying the Motion to Suppress 
is set forth on page 70 of the record and the Findings of Fact, 
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Conclusions of Law and Order page 77 of the record. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
The Defendant's pretrial Motion to Suppress Supported by 
a Pretrial Memorandum and a Post-Hearing Memorandum. The 
Motion was denied by the Court in a written memorandum 
decision and order and an Interlocutory Appeal was granted 
by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On June 8, 1995, at 6:50 a.m. in the morning, Sevier 
County Deputy Sheriff Phil Barney parked his marked patrol 
vehicle off the westbound lane on Interstate 70 in Sevier 
County, Utah checking eastbound cars on radar. (Transcript 
of Hearing on Motion to Suppress of January, 9 1996, Page 
169) 
2. The Deputy observed a white passenger car coming 
toward him around a curve in the eastbound lane of travel 
and he testified that the car was in the right hand or "slow 
lane" and allegedly crossed the line once to the left-hand 
or "fast" lane. (R.198) The curve on the highway was a 
right-hand curve and the direction the car moved out of the 
lane is the same direction that the inertia of the vehicle 
8 
would tend to move the vehicle. (R. 195) The car was not 
speeding and as the car came in close proximity to the 
stationary patrol vehicle, the Deputy looked at the driver 
to see if he appeared impaired and did not note anything 
unusual about the occupants or the manner the car was being 
operated. (R 198) The Appellant's car was not interfering 
with any other vehicles on the highway. (R. 196) The 
officer did not note any quick or erratic movement over and 
back across the center line dividing the lanes of the 
highway and he described the movement as a smooth 
transition, not "over and back." (R 196) On cross-
examination, the Deputy stated that a car being driven by a 
sleepy person usually makes an abrupt or quick movement back 
into the lane and the movement he said that he observed was 
"not an unusual comeback"(R. 219) 
3. While pursing the vehicle, the Deputy did not note 
any other unusual movement of the vehicle. The operator of 
the vehicle signaled when the car moved quickly moved off 
the highway in response to the overhead lights of the 
pursuing patrol vehicle. (R.198) When the vehicle was 
stopped, there was no problem with either the driver's 
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license or the registration. No equipment violations such 
as a broken window, license plate deficiencies or improper 
registrations were observed by the Deputy. 
4. Deputy Barney has admitted that he does not normally 
issue traffic citations for this type of lane travel 
violation. The Deputy would not have written a citation and 
would have probably written a warning citation if this were 
the only traffic problem observed. (R.194 of Preliminary 
Hearing page 194) 
5. The Deputy testified that they specially assigned 
him to the Interstate Highway system for the full eight 
hours of his shift and no other Sheriff Deputies has such an 
assignment (R.177) He testified that he has developed 
special techniques for drug interdiction during traffic 
investigations (R 177) Deputy Barney stated that the majority 
of the persons that he arrested on Interstate 70 for drug 
offenses are our-of-state persons and all of those arrests 
started as traffic investigations(R. 179) 
6. Concerning driving under the influence and driving 
while impaired investigations, Deputy Barney testified that 
he does not follow a vehicle to develop a driving pattern, 
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acknowledging that other officers pull behind a vehicle and 
follow the car for a period of time to develop a driving 
pattern by observing how the vehicle travels down the 
roadway.(R. 182) He testified that one movement of a 
vehicle across a lane line is a sufficient driving pattern 
for him to stop the vehicle(R. 183) The officer 
acknowledged on cross-examination that other officer follow 
the vehicle to determine a driving pattern which may 
discount the initial observation as an indication of 
impaired driving.(R.190) Under his technique he pulls cars 
over right away and when asked if he may be mistaken in 
pulling a car over without a driving pattern stated: 
[Answer]: Yes. I often pull people over that—that are 
watching the scenery, that someone's getting a drink, and 
they bob a little. (R. 190 and 191) 
7. The Deputy stated that he was sure that he pulled 
over more cars than other officers because of his technique 
of stopping immediately upon any possible sign of erratic 
driving.(R. 191) He claimed that he did this because of an 
incident where a vehicle rolled over while he was following 
the vehicle and not because this was a technique to further 
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his drug investigations.(R. 191) 
8. The Deputy acknowledged that the vehicles often make 
unusual or erratic movements when they are traveling down 
the Interstate freeway and observe a law enforcement patrol 
car in a position monitoring the highway for possible 
traffic violations. (R. 192) He testified that his vehicle 
was visible in the median (R. 188) The Defendant Charles 
Dion testified that he saw the patrol car from 
approximately one mile from the interchange and slowed his 
vehicle and made adjustments to the vehicle speed because of 
the Deputy Sheriff's presence.(R. 226) The Defendant 
testified that the car may have moved slightly but that he 
didn't cross the center line. (R. 226) 
9. In relation to Appellant's stop, the Deputy 
testified that as soon as the vehicle passed his position 
that he turned on his overhead lights.(R. 200) Immediately 
prior to the stop, the officer was able to view the driver 
as the car came close to his location in the median.(R. 198) 
He said the driver was "staring straight ahead" (R. 199) 
10. After the stop, the officer was able to determine 
very quickly that the driver did not appear to be impaired 
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or tired. (R.201) 
11. A review of the video tape made during the incident 
indicates that the Deputy Sheriff did not place himself in a 
position to be able to smell any odor coming from the 
vehicle and he did not change that position during the 
relevant portions of the traffic stop. (Exhibit 5) At the 
Preliminary Hearing, the officer claimed that when the 
driver rolled down the window while he was standing next to 
the vehicle and there was a "gush of air" out of the 
vehicle.(R.131) At the Motion to Suppress hearing, the 
Deputy claimed that on the gush of air that he could smell 
an odor of two or three substances, one of which was an a 
vanilla odor and the other he described as "Cling Free" 
laundry sheets.(R.204) The Deputy also said he could smell 
the odor of raw marijuana upon his first contact with the 
occupants.(R. 170) 
12. The Deputy obtained a driver's license from the 
driver and walked back to his vehicle and ran a check of the 
prior criminal history of the driver, Mr Dion, over the 
radio in his patrol car.(R. 170) Dispatch log records 
indicate that at a information request was made concerning 
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the driver, Mr. Dion. Both of the searches came back 
negative. The Deputy Sheriff, even though he claimed to have 
smelled an odor of marijuana, admitted that he did not 
contact a back-up unit or request that dispatch send out 
additional officers. (R. 208) The Deputy then walked back to 
the car and gave the back the Driver's licenses and the car 
rental contract.(R. 171) 
13. After handing back the documents, the Deputy then 
asked the driver if he was carrying narcotics. When the 
driver denied that he was, the Deputy asked if he might look 
in the car.(R.171) At that time the Mr. Dion told the 
officer that he would prefer it if the officer did not 
search.(R.171) The Deputy testified that the Driver's 
hesitation made him suspicious(R.216) 
14. At that time the Deputy ordered both to step our 
of the vehicle and ordered them to step to the rear of the 
vehicle and began to search the car stating that the car 
reeked of marijuana.(R.171) A review of the video tape 
shows that the Deputy began searching generally in and 
around the front seat area of the vehicle and did not appear 
to be following the scent of alleged marijuana. After 
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opening the trunk, 210 pounds of marijuana was found in the 
trunk. Until opened by the officer, the packages were 
tightly wrapped and sealed. 
15. Charles Dion took the stand and testified that he 
and the passenger had spent the night in a motel in southern 
Utah and had only been traveling for an hour and a half when 
he was pulled over.(R.221) He testified that he saw the 
Deputy and was aware of the deputies presence.(R. 224) 
16. He testified that he rolled the window down prior 
to the time the Deputy arrived next to his car.(R.227) He 
along with the passenger had both been smoking cigarettes in 
the vehicle.(R.230) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The arresting officer was parked in the median of the 
Interstate Highway and testified that he saw a vehicle barley 
cross the line and drive in the other eastbound lane as the car 
drove around a curve toward his position. He never observed any 
pattern of driving and after the one brief observation drove his 
vehicle through the median and immediately turned on his overhead 
lights to effect a stop because of a possibility of impairment. 
The Appellants submits the car in which the Appellant's were 
riding should not have been stopped and should have been allowed 
15 
to drive on the Interstate without being arbitrarily stopped 
without probable cause. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SHOULD LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS BE REQUIRED UNDER THE FOURTH 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
TO HAVE SUFFICIENT REASON TO STOP A VEHICLE FOR A TRAFFIC 
VIOLATION? 
A police officer's stop of a vehicle is a seizure and 
the stop is subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Sandy 
City vs Thorsness 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1989) (defendant 
not lawfully stopped for investigation of driving while 
intoxicated where observed conduct was consistent with that 
of normal driver), State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1994) . The Fourth Amendment applies to investigatory stops 
of vehicles "regardless of the reason for the stop or the 
brevity of the detention." State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 
(Utah App. 1990) In addition, the State bears the initial 
burden for establishing the articulable factual basis for 
the reasonable suspicion necessary to support an 
investigative stop. State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4(Utah App. 
1994). 
In State v. Lopez, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the 
"pretext stop" doctrine in favor of the rule of law articulated 
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in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648 (1979) The Court stated: 
Our decision today should not be interpreted to mean that 
evidence of an officer's subjective intent or departure from 
standard police practice is never relevant to the determination 
of Fourth Amendment claims... In this context, compliance with or 
departure from police department procedures is particularly 
relevant in determining whether an officer conducted the 
inventory search pretextually. 
Likewise, an officer's subjective suspicions unrelated to 
the traffic violation for which he or she stops a defendant can 
be used by defense counsel to show that the officer fabricated 
the violation. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). The 
more evidence that a detention was motivated by police suspicions 
unrelated to the traffic offense, the less credible the officer's 
assertion that the traffic offense occurred. If the trial court 
finds no traffic violation, then the stop is not justified at its 
inception and is therefore unconstitutional, 
(emphasis added) 
A stop is justified if there is a reasonable suspicion that 
the defendant is involved in criminal activity. State v. Carpena, 
714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (stating police must 
base reasonable suspicion on objective facts indicating 
defendant's criminal activity). While the required level of 
suspicion is lower than the standard required for probable cause 
to arrest, the same totality of facts and circumstances approach 
is used to determine if there are sufficient "specific and 
articulable facts" to support reasonable suspicion. Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21. 
In Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, the United States Supreme Court 
stated that in as objective standard is important in assessing 
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the reasonableness of a stop, search or seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment, and the Court stated: 
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only 
when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those 
charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more 
detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the 
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the 
particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is 
imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard 
; would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief" that the action taken was appropriate? Anything less 
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights 
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a 
result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. 
(citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) 
A key issue presented by this appeal is whether the 
observations of the Defendants' car by the Deputy warranted 
immediate pursuit and the stopping of the vehicle for an alleged 
traffic offense for the single movement between the two lanes of 
eastbound travel and the Interstate Highway. The Deputy observed 
a car traveling through a curve in the road at the appropriate 
speed and when confronted with a marked law enforcement patrol 
vehicle the car may have momentarily driven across the lane 
dividing line into the other lane which was not being used by 
other vehicles. 
The Appellants submit that the Deputy did not have an 
objective reason to pursue and stop the car for a violation of 
the traffic rules and regulations. The vehicle could lawfully 
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travel in either lane and the applicable statute only requires 
that the vehicle be driven "as nearly as practical" in the lane. 
The applicable section, Utah Code Annotated 41-6-61(1953) states: 
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes 
for traffic the following provisions apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical 
entirely within a single lane and may not be moved from the 
lane until the operator has determined the movement can be 
made safely. 
(2) On a roadway divided into three lanes... (n/a) 
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected 
directing specified traffic to use a designated lane or 
designating those lanes to be used by traffic moving in a 
particular direction regardless of the center of the 
roadway. Operators of vehicles shall obey the directions of 
these devices. 
In State v. Bello 871 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1994), the 
facts leading to suppression of a search and seizure by the 
same Deputy were as follows: 
On March 15, 1991, at approximately 11:15 a.m., Deputy 
Phil Barney was traveling west on 1-7 0 when he noticed 
Bellofs eastbound pickup truck temporarily drift so that it 
straddled both eastbound lanes of traffic. Barney turned his 
vehicle around, activated his video recorder, and pursued 
the truck in order to stop it and determine whether the 
driver of the vehicle was under the influence of alcohol, 
drowsy, or otherwise impaired. For the approximately two 
miles that Barney followed the truck, he observed no further 
problems that might indicate an impaired driver, and he 
stated at the hearing on the motion to suppress that there 
were extreme wind conditions that day that might account for 
the temporary drifting of the truck into the other lane.... 
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In Bello, the State contended that when Bello's truck 
briefly crossed the center line of the eastbound lanes, the 
defendant violated a statute requiring that a vehicle be 
operated "as nearly as practical entirely within a single 
lane." Utah Code Ann. 41-6-61(1) (1953). Next, the State 
argued that Bello's weaving provided Deputy Barney with 
reasonable suspicion that Bello was driving while impaired 
by drugs or alcohol. This Court stated: 
With respect to the argument that Bello could be 
legitimately stopped for violating section 41-6-61(1), we 
note that the statute requires only that a vehicle remain 
entirely in a single lane "as nearly as practical." It was 
extremely windy on the morning in question and Bello's truck 
had a camper shell that caused it to catch the wind more 
easily than other vehicles. These facts, in combination with 
the fact that in the two miles that Barney followed Bello he 
observed no further weaving, lead us to conclude that the 
single instance of weaving seen by Barney could not 
constitute a violation of section 41-6-61(1) and therefore 
cannot serve as the constitutional basis for stopping 
Bello's truck. 
The State's second argument in justification of the stop 
relies upon the existence of reasonable suspicion that Bello 
was involved in criminal activity -- driving while under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol. In determining whether 
reasonable suspicion exists, this court looks to the 
totality of the circumstances present at the time the 
officer decided to stop the vehicle. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 
975. The officer must be able to articulate facts and 
inferences from these facts that would "'warrant a [person] 
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken 
was appropriate. Anything less would invite intrusions upon 
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
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substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court 
has consistently refused to sanction." State v. Trujillo, 
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)). 
This Court rejected the claim of reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity on the single incident of weaving 
witnessed by Deputy Barney and held that in light of the 
totality of circumstances the single incident of "weaving" 
was inadequate to justify the traffic stop of Bello's 
vehicle. The Court found that the initial suspicion, 
triggered by a minor driving aberration, was not 
corroborated and Bello did not violate Utah Code Annotated 
41-6-61(1) by weaving once in high winds, and did not 
provide reasonable suspicion that Bello was driving under 
the influence justifying the stop of Bello's vehicle. The 
Court stated: 
As the Tenth Circuit recently noted, "If failure to 
follow a perfect vector down the highway . . . were 
sufficient reason to suspect a person of driving while 
impaired, a substantial portion of the public would be 
subject each day to an invasion of their privacy." United 
States v. Lyons, No. 93-4079, slip op. at 7 (10th Cir. Nov. 
2, 1993) 
In United States v. Terry Lee, No. 94-4199 (10th Cir 
1996), the Tenth Circuit analyzed a stop by the same officer 
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as follows: 
Deputy Sheriff Phil Barney of the Sevier County 
Sheriff's Office was operating a stationary radar on 
Interstate 70 at the Sigurd, Utah, interchange at 
approximately 7 a.m. on June 23, 1993. He was positioned 
facing westbound in the center of the median. Deputy 
Sheriff Barney observed a white Buick traveling eastbound 
and straddling the lane marker as it approached. The 
vehicle was directly in the center of the center line and 
straddled it for about 100 to 150 feet (or for about one 
second) before it proceeded into the outside lane of 
traffic. Deputy Sheriff Barney observed that the driver of 
the automobile was African-American and that the car had a 
California license plate. He then immediately turned his 
vehicle around and pursued the African-American driving the 
Buick with out-of-state license plates. 
Deputy Sheriff Barney testified that straddling the line 
was not clearly a violation of the law, except for possibly 
being an improper lane change for failure to signal. He 
did, however, consider this conduct to be indicative of a 
sleepy or intoxicated driver. His purported concern was 
that the driver of the Buick with out-of-state license 
plates might be sleepy or intoxicated. Deputy Sheriff 
Barney saw no further driving irregularities as he pursued 
and pulled over the driver of the Buick. 
The Tenth Circuit Court stated: 
While the stop in this case appears to be clearly 
pretextual, our inquiry into the officer's justification is 
severely limited by our recent decision in United States v. 
Botero-Ospina, 1995 WL 723102 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
Under Botero-Ospina, "[o]ur sole inquiry is whether this 
particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this 
particular motorist violated vany one of the multitude of 
applicable traffic and equipment regulations' of the 
jurisdiction." 
The Court in Lee found that the "purported" concern that 
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the Defendant with out-of-state license plates might be 
sleepy or intoxicated because he had changed lanes is 
sufficient to justify the stop under Botero-Ospina. 
However, the Court assumed that the lane movement was a 
violation of Utah traffic laws or a reasonable suspicion of 
impairment. 
The Appellant's have through cross examination at the 
Motion to Suppress Hearing proven that the officer would not 
normally issue a citation for this type of lane travel. 
Further, the evidence at the hearing established that the 
trooper does not wait for evidence of a criminal violation 
by a driving pattern and stops without further observations 
on the road. The Appellant submits that under the approach 
of the Tenth Circuit, the State must prove an actual traffic 
violation, not a possible violation before a vehicle would 
be stopped by an officer conducting a traffic investgation. 
Therefore, this Court should decide one brief movement 
of a vehicle between travel lanes is a not a violation of 
Utah traffic laws and not a reason to immediately stop a 
vehicle to check for the safety of possible impaired or 
tired drivers. As acknowledged at the hearing on the Motion 
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to Suppress in testimony by the Sheriff's Deputy, other law 
enforcement officers would have turned and followed the car 
and upon determining that no driving problems existed would 
have not stopped the car. 
The Appellants submit that the Deputy Sheriff has 
developed a procedure which allows him to patrol the 
Interstate Highway and to randomly stop out of state 
vehicles to search for controlled substances without actual 
traffic violations. Under the rationale of the State and 
this Deputy Sheriff, any out of state motorist on the 
interstate highway through Sevier County could be possibly 
tired because they could hae driven from another state and 
subject to being stopped for the slightest movement on the 
highway or merely to check to see if they are tired. The 
case presents objective evidence of investigatory 
procedures, not the subjective evidence of the officers 
intent. 
The Deputy Sheriff's specialized manner of patrolling 
the Interstate Highway in Sevier County while assigned to 
traffic patrol allows him to make a substantial number of 
arrests for drug offenses. As a usual course of events, the 
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officer admittedly immediately pulls over vehicles on any 
erratic movement instead of following the vehicle to 
determine whether the brief erratic movement can be 
discounted. As a result, the Deputy Sheriff stops persons 
before there is a driving pattern showing indication of an 
impaired driver and before the law enforcement officer has 
probable cause the driving is indication of a traffic 
offense. 
This technique differs from other traffic patrol law 
enforcement officers and leads to drug arrests are out-of-
state residents. (as well as the suppression of evidence 
based upon illegal procedures, see State v. Matison 875 P.2d 
584, United States v. Terry Lee, No. 94-4199 (10th Cir 
1996),and, State v. Bello 871 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1994)) 
In State v. Matison 875 P.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1994), the 
court noted that a stop is justified when the officer has 
"reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is 
committing a traffic offense, such as driving under the 
influence of alcohol or driving without a license . . . [or 
that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal 
activity, such as transporting drugs". The Court stated: 
25 
In the present case, Deputy Barney's stop of the vehicle 
was not "fjustified at its inception.1" Lopez, 237 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 11. Defendant did not commit a traffic offense 
immediately prior to being stopped. Deputy Barney had 
earlier witnessed a vehicle fishtail, then drove to the area 
where the incident had occurred and determined that it was 
not the result of hazardous road conditions. However, he did 
nothing more concerning the incident even though he was 
aware of defendant's location; instead, he proceeded away 
from the site of the incident. He later stopped defendant 
only because, by mere happenstance, defendant was traveling 
in the same direction as Deputy Barney. 
An observation of one incident of movement across one 
lane dividing line is not "weaving". The phrase "weaving" 
by definition must refer to a pattern of repeated erratic 
lane changes. The officer never observed any pattern of 
driving and after one brief observation drove his vehicle 
through the median and immediately turned on his overhead 
lights to effect detention. 
The Court should follow the analysis of State v. Bello as to 
whether or not the vehicle should be stopped and not abandon 
critical analysis of the reasons for the stop. Under a critical 
analysis, the Appellant submits that the State failed to prove 
the stop not based upon objective evidence of a violation of 
traffic law. 
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POINT II 
SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE FOUND THAT THE UNIQUE 
INVESTIGATORY TECHNIQUE OF STOPPING A VEHICLE BEFORE 
DEVELOPING PROBABLE CAUSE OF A DRIVING PATTERN IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNIQUE DEVELOPED TO STOP THE OUT-OF-
STATE VEHICLE TO INVESTIGATE FOR POSSIBLE DRUG VIOLATIONS? 
In Whren v. United States, No. 95-5841 (June 10, 1996), the 
United States Supreme Court held the temporary detention of a 
motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated the 
traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition 
against unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would 
not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law 
enforcement objective. In Whren, the Petitioners claimed that 
because the police may be tempted to use commonly occurring 
traffic violations as means of investigating violations of other 
laws, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be 
whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the car for the 
purpose of enforcing the traffic violation at issue. However, 
the Court ruled that ulterior motives can invalidate police 
conduct justified on the basis of probable cause and subjective 
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis. 
The Appellant's submit that the Whren decision supports 
their position on appeal. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
importance of requiring actual probable cause before law 
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enforcement officers can intervene and conduct a roadside drug 
investigation. Without probable cause, there should be no stop. 
The district court should have found that the unique 
investigatory technique of stopping a vehicle before 
developing probable cause of a driving pattern is 
unconstitutional. 
The requirement of probable cause in stopping a vehicle 
is important safeguard of Constitutional rights. Any 
vehicle traveling down the road in a remote county could be 
pulled over to see if the driver is tired or impaired. 
Such random stopping of vehicles is forbidden by the United 
States Constitution. 
POINT III 
SHOULD THE LOWER COURT HAVE APPLIED "COMMUNITY 
CARETAKER" LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO RANDOM STOPS MADE TO 
CHECK POSSIBLE TIRED DRIVERS? 
The technique of stopping a vehicle on the slightest 
movement without a driving pattern differs from other 
traffic patrol law enforcement officers. Because this 
technique the Deputy admittedly does not wait for probable 
cause of Driving under the influence offense, the only 
logical basis to stop a vehicle must based upon the deputies 
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policy be as a community caretaker stopping possibly tired 
drivers. 
In order to prove that the vehicle was stopped for 
public safety reasons, the Appellant's submit that the 
Courts should require the State to prove that the Deputy 
Sheriff had justification to stop vehicles under the 
community caretakers' exception set forth in Provo City v. 
Warden 844 P.2d 360 (Ct. App. 1992). Because Deputy 
Sheriff Barney was purportedly acting to stop drivers that 
maybe tired or possibly impaired prior to observing probable 
cause of a traffic offense, the issue becomes whether the 
law enforcement officer was authorized and required to make 
"welfare" stops of citizens under these circumstances? 
In Warden, the Court adopted a three tiered test to 
determine if a stop is reasonable and lawful under the 
Fourth Amendment. Under this analysis, a trial court must 
evaluate the legitimacy of an alleged community caretaker 
stop as follows: First, did a seizure occur under the Fourth 
Amendment definition of that term? Second, based upon an 
objective analysis, was the seizure in pursuit of a bona 
fide community caretaker function -- under the given 
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circumstances, would a reasonable officer have stopped a 
vehicle for a purpose consistent with community caretaker 
functions? Third, based upon an objective analysis, did the 
circumstances demonstrate an imminent danger to life or 
limb? The exception requires circumstances threatening 
life or safety, rather than using exigent situations as 
merely a factor in a mix of considerations. In Warden, the 
court stated: 
We also note that stops which are legitimate exercises 
of police community caretaker responsibilities, but which 
are not "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, may result 
in application of the exclusionary rule, while still 
achieving the objectives of community caretaking. This 
appears to be a legitimate means of encouraging genuine 
police caretaking functions while deterring bogus or 
pretextual police activities. 
The evidence at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress 
proved that Sheriff of Sevier County has authorized Deputy 
Sheriff Barney to patrol the interstate highway system on a 
full time basis. Because of prior success in drug 
investigations reasons, the Deputy is in a position to 
monitor, stop and search out of state vehicles for 
controlled substances investigations. While most vehicles 
never stop in the County and are passing through on the 
Interstate Highway system. Deputy Sheriff Barney does not 
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stop cars without a driving pattern because of public safety 
or "courtesy" to see if they may be tired or impaired if a 
vehicle crosses the lane dividing line just once, before any 
pattern of vehicular movement is observed. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the Deputy 
Sheriff acknowledged that he arrests an unusually high 
number of persons traveling on the interstate system for 
out-of-state for drug offenses using a technique which 
results in mistakenly pulling over some motorists. Under his 
technique he pulls cars over right away and when asked if he 
may be mistaken in pulling a car over without a driving 
pattern stated: 
[Answer] : Yes. I often pull people over that— that are 
watching the scenery, that someone's getting a drink, and 
they bob a little. (R. 190 and 191) 
He stops out of state vehicles to investigate the occupants 
for control substance violations and the State cannot 
overcome the truth of this procedure by cloaking the 
investigatory technique in purported concern for the welfare 
of the traveling public. The Appellants submits the State did 
not prove that the justification to stop was a community 
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caretaker function. Therefore, the Motion to Suppress should 
have been granted. 
POINT IV 
WERE THE DEFENDANTS UNLAWFULLY DETAINED AFTER THE DEPUTY 
HANDED BACK THE DRIVERS LICENSE AND THEN ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN 
CONSENT TO SEARCH? 
The Deputy Sheriff, even though he claimed to have 
smelled an odor of marijuana, admitted that he did not 
contact a back-up unit or request that dispatch send out 
additional officers. (R. 208) The Deputy then walked back to 
the car and gave the back the Driver's licenses and the car 
rental contract.(R. 171) 
After handing back the documents, the Deputy then asked 
the driver if he was carrying narcotics. When the driver 
denied that he was, the Deputy asked if he might look in the 
car.(R.171) At that time the Mr. Dion told the officer that 
he would prefer it if the officer did not search.(R.171) The 
Deputy testified that the Driver's hesitation made him 
suspicious (R.216) A review of the video tape of the incident 
does not support the subjective assertions of the Deputy. 
(See Addendum) 
The claim here is an initial odor of marijuana which 
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resulted in de facto arrest and removal of the occupants 
from the vehicle and a warrantless search of the vehicle. 
The video tape shows the Defendants being detained outside 
of the vehicle and being ordered to place themselves in a 
position not to view the search of the vehicle. The Courts 
have analyzed critically the stop of vehicles and a 
warrantless search without consent based upon the subjective 
odor of a controlled substance. United States v. Nielsen 9 
F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993)(a police officer's alleged smell 
of burnt marijuana was not probable cause to search the 
trunk of the car, when there was no corroborating evidence 
that defendant had recently smoked marijuana and no 
marijuana was found in the vehicle) 
In United States v. Lyons 7 F.D. 973 (10th Cir. 
1993)the court found a stop illegal. In that decision, the 
Court noted the following facts: 
While on routine patrol with another officer on 1-15 in 
Juab County, Utah, Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah 
Highway Patrol was attracted to a pickup truck "by the way 
this vehicle was being operated on the road." Following the 
truck for approximately two miles, Sergeant Mangelson saw it 
"weave" three to four times within its lane of the divided 
highway. The two lanes in the truck's direction of travel 
were sixteen to eighteen feet wide, and during the period of 
Mangelsonfs observation the truck remained within its own 
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lane. 
Recalling that some drivers on this stretch of road came 
from gambling in Las Vegas or Mesquite, Nevada, where they 
had been drinking or had gone without sleep, Mangelson 
decided to investigate further... 
After initially obtaining defendant's driver's license, 
however, Mangelson did nothing to determine whether Mr. 
Lyons was impaired. He asked no questions about drinking or 
lack of sleep; administered no roadside sobriety tests; did 
not request the defendant submit to blood, breath, or urine 
tests; and issued no citation for driving while impaired. 
Moreover, he noticed no smell of alcohol on defendant's 
breath and observed nothing about his person indicating he 
was impaired in any way. Mangelson explained he did none of 
these things because the situation "went from a suspected 
DUI to a second degree felony. So there was no need to 
pursue that." 
He acknowledged in his experience "entirely innocent" 
drivers would react to the presence of a police car by 
"keeping their eyes on the road." He recognized that doing 
so was not unusual. He agreed "very few" people drive on the 
interstate without "some weaving" in their lane of traffic 
and admitted that Defendant's "weaving" violated no Utah 
law. He also conceded he was unable to articulate any 
specific reason for believing Defendant was impaired and 
merely relied upon his "sixth sense as an experienced 
highway patrolman." 
The Court stated: 
We also believe Mangelson1s admissions concerning the 
universality of drivers' "weaving" in their lanes and the 
commonness of people's avoiding eye contact with police 
officers while driving significantly undercut the 
rationality of using these factors as objective reasons for 
the legitimacy of the stop. Indeed, if failure to follow a 
perfect vector down the highway or keeping one's eyes on the 
road were sufficient reasons to suspect a person of driving 
while impaired, a substantial portion of the public would be 
subject each day to an invasion of their privacy. 
The Court held that the stop was pretextual and the 
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seizure that followed was tainted and should have been 
suppressed. 
In the United States vs. Lee the government contended 
that the search was valid because Deputy Barney obtained 
consent from the Defendant. The Court noted that an 
encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed to 
be consensual unless the driver's documents have been 
returned to him, citing the case of United States vs. 
Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 Fed. d. 1479 (Tenth Circuit, 1994) . The 
conviction of the Defendant in the Lee case were reversed 
and the case remanded to the district court for dismissal of 
the charges. 
The Court should apply State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1994)because once a stop is made, the detention "'must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop.'" Id. at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 500 (1983)); see also State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 
763 (Utah 1991); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987) 
(per curiam). The officer claimed to be conducting a routine 
traffic stop and requested a driver's license and vehicle 
registration, conducted a computer check, and handed back the 
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drivers license to the driver before inquiring about consent to 
search. The lower court should have granted the suppression on 
the basis of this evidence. 
POINT V 
DID THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEPUTY WAS NOT IN A 
POSITION TO DETECT THE ODOR OF MARIJUANA AND THE OBJECTIVE 
FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT THE DEPUTIES SUBJECTIVE ALLEGATION? 
The Appellants submit that the video tape of the stop 
(See Addendum) and objective facts do not corroborate the 
immediate detection by the officer of a strong odor of 
marijuana sufficient enough to take custody of the 
Defendants and search the vehicle without consent. The 
officer did not call for backup and returned his vehicle to 
conduct a check for warrants. Then he returned and gave to 
the driver his Driver's License and registration before 
inquiring as to consent to search only after he was denied 
consent were the Appellant's ordered out of the car. 
The Courts have analyzed critically the stop of vehicles 
and a warrantless search without consent based upon the 
subjective odor of a controlled substance. United States 
v. Nielsen 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993) (a police officer's 
alleged smell of burnt marijuana was not probable cause to 
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search the trunk of the car, when there was no corroborating 
evidence that defendant had recently smoked marijuana and no 
marijuana was found in the vehicle) 
The officer never positioned his body in close proximity 
to the window(see addendum) In light of his own admissions 
concerning multiple odors and the long delay before ordering 
the defendant's out of the car, the State cannot prove 
probable cause to search without a warrant and the Motion to 
Suppress should be granted. Therefore, the Court erred in 
denying the Motion to Suppress. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
In conclusion, the Court should reverse the denial 
of the Motion to Suppress. The Defendants should not have 
been stopped and should have been allowed to drive on the 
interstate without being arbitrarily stopped for a drug 
investigation without probable cause of a violation of the 
Traffic Code. The Appellant requests the Court enter an order 
reversing the denial of the Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this day of September, 1996. 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney for the 
Defendant-Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Video captures of Exhibit 5 introduced at the hearing of the 
video tape of arrest of the Defendants.(Record page 203) 
2. Ruling of the District court. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed postage prepaid to: 
CHRISTINE SOLTIS 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, #600 
P. 0. BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114 
DATED this day of September, 1996. 
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1. Video captures of Exhibit 5 introduced at the hearing of 
thye video tape of arrest.(Record page 203) 

DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SEVIER COUNTY 
895 East 300 North, Richfield, Utah 8470* 
Telephone (801) 896-2700, Facsimile (801) 896-8047 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
DECISION ON MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
vs. 
Case number 951600159 and 
951600158 
CHARLES V. DION AND 
JASON WOODS, 
Judge David L. Mower 
Defendant. 
Defendants have made a Motion to suppress certain evidence that was seized from 
them in this case. There have been two hearings, a hearing on their Motion to Suppress as 
well as a preliminary examination. Based on the evidence presented at those two hearings, 
the Court is sufficiently advised to allow it to make the following findings of fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Phil H. Barney is a deputy sheriff of Sevier County, Utah. 
2. The defendants are individuals. 
3. On or about June 8, 1995 the defendants were traveling eastbound on Interstate 
Highway 70 (1-70) in Sevier County, Utah, traveling in a 1996 Mercury Cougar, which 
is a sedan-type automobile. 
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4. Deputy Barney was inside his patrol vehicle which was stationary and facing 
westbound in the median of 1-70. 
5. 1-70 is a freeway with two lanes for eastbound traffic and two for westbound. 
6. During daylight hours Deputy Barney saw the Eastbound Mercury driving such that it 
straddled the lane divider line. To be more specific, Deputy Barney said that when he 
observed the Mercury coming towards him around a curve it's left wheels were about 
one foot across the lane divider line, and that the vehicle moved into the outside lane 
before it passed his position. 
7. Deputy Barney made a U-turn, activated his overhead lights, and followed the Mercury 
until it stopped after about one mile of travel. 
8. No other traffic violations were observed. 
9. Section 41-6-61(1), Utah Code, provides as follows: 
A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely within 
a single lane and may not be moved from the lane until the 
operator has determined the movement can be made safely. 
10. Deputy Barney has been in the presence of raw marijuana on many occasions in the 
past and recognizes it's smell. 
U. Deputy Barney approached the Mercury and smelled marijuana. 
12. The driver rolled down the window. Deputy Barney smelled marijuana. 
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13 Deputy Barney asked for drivers license and registration. The registered owner of the 
vehicle was not present. 
14. Deputy Barney asked for consent to search, which was not given. 
15. Deputy Barney searched the vehicle without consent and without a search warrant. He 
located 210 pounds of marijuana in the trunk. 
16. The weather conditions on June 8, 1995 were clear, calm and dry. 
17. Deputy Barney never saw the Mercury interfere with the driving or operation of any 
other vehicle. 
DECISION 
The Motion to Suppress ought to be denied. 
ANALYSIS 
The State is not entitled to activate it's police powers and interrupt the travels of 
citizens by stopping and thereby seizing their motor vehicles unless the traffic stop in 
question was either (1) based upon a traffic violation committed in a policeman's presence, or 
(2) because of specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom that 
would lead a reasonable policeman to conclude that the occupant of the vehicle had 
committed or was about to commit a crime. 
It is a crime to operate a vehicle outside of a designated lane of travel. Section 41-6-
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61(1), Utah Code. 
It is true that under some circumstances it is not practical to operate one's vehicle 
within the designated lane of travel. In fact, in the recent case of State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 
584, the Utah Court of Appeals indicated that it may have been impractical for a driver who 
was driving a pickup truck equipped with a camper shell to maintain proper lane travel under 
high wind conditions. However, no such adverse driving conditions were present in this 
case. 
Violation of the lane-travel statute shows that the driver could be impaired, such as 
by drowsiness or by the ingestion of some type of chemical. It is a crime to drive while 
impaired. Section 41-6-44, Utah Code, prohibits driving while under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs, or a combination of the two; Section 41-6-46 prohibits driving at a speed too fast for 
existing conditions (it would be a violation of this statute to drive a vehicle at any speed if 
the driver were in the condition of being asleep); Section 41-6-45 prohibits reckless driving, 
which would also apply to sleepy drivers. 
The officer observed a crime. He had probable cause to stop the Mercury. He 
smelled marijuana. He had probable cause to search for and seize it without a warrant 
because it was in a movable automobile, whose occupants were alerted. State v. Larocco. 794 
P.2d 460 (Utah Supreme Court., 1990). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Motion to Suppress ought to be denied. Mr. Brown is directed to prepare an 
appropriate order and to submit it for execution by following the procedure set forth in Rule 
4-504, Code of Judicial Administration. 
if Signed on March / * , 1996 
mui 
David L. Mower, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On March /$' a . 1996 a copy of the above DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
was sent to each of the following by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method (Mail, in person. i**) Addressee Method (Man, in Person, .^o 
Mr. R. Don Brown \j) Mr. Randall Gaither 
Sevier County Attorney Attorney at Law 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 321 South 600 East 
Richfield, UT 84701 Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
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